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HOW TO AVOID THE CONSTRAINTS OF
RULE 1OB-5(B): A FIRST CIRCUIT GUIDE
FOR UNDERWRITERS
ERIC H. FRANKLIN*

If an underwriterknows that a prospectus contains a material
misrepresentation,may that underwriter use the prospectus to sell
securities, or would that expose the underwriter to liability under
Rule 10b-5(b)? The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit's surprisingand rather disconcertinganswer was delivered
on March 10, 2010, in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Tambone. In Tambone, the First Circuit held that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) could not hold underwriters
liable for such misrepresentations if they did not draft the
prospectus. Ostensibly, this holding is nothing more than a judicial
check on the SEC's enforcement powers under Rule 10b-5(b).
However, the practical result of this holding is disturbing. This
decision not only provides a perverse incentive for prospectus
drafters to be as ignorant as possible, but it also teaches
unscrupulous underwriters how to use material misstatements
without running afoul of Rule 10b-5(b). The decision sharply
constrains the enforcement powers of the SEC and is in direct
conflict with both the intent of Rule 10b-5(b) and the current desire
to increase regulatory scrutiny of financial markets. Regardless of
the outcome, U.S. Supreme Court review of this decision is vital. A
reversal of the decision would represent a victory for investors and
a blow to dishonest securities sales techniques, and an affirmation
of the decision might inspire Congress to reinstate the SEC with the
enforcement powers necessary to protect investors.
I.

INTRODUCTION: AN UNDERWRITER'S DILEMMA

Imagine an underwriter. Given the poor economy that
currently plagues our markets, it should not be a great exercise to
imagine that our underwriter has found his job difficult of late.1
* Whiting Clinical Fellow, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D.
Cornell, B.A. University of Texas. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Mark
Dunn, University of Denver Sturm College of Law class of 2010, University of
Washington Law School 2011 LLM Candidate, for his invaluable research
assistance and insightful commentary.
1. However undeserved, the author assumes a modicum of posterity by
reminding future readers of the financial crisis of the late aughts, caused in
931

932

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:931

But perhaps this difficulty is unwarranted. After all, our
underwriter does not make his livelihood trading in subprime
mortgage-backed securities, 2 and he does not work for an
investment bank that lavishes its employees with outrageous
bonuses.3 Rather, our underwriter has made his salary selling
mutual funds, a product that is neither the blame of the financial
crisis4 nor a provider of year-end riches. Regardless, business is
not good. Investors, justifiably wary of exotic securities, have
turned a critical eye to more familiar investment vehicles, and our
underwriter's product is not immune.5
Mutual funds, long the favored investment of the prudent,6
have been scrutinized by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) due to a practice known as "market timing." Market timing,
the trading of mutual-fund stock in a manner that exploits pricing
inefficiencies, is not illegal.7 It is, however, costly, and the SEC

part by the trading of mortgage-backed securities.
2. Mortgage-backed securities have been defined, rather dryly, as "bonds
issued by large financial institutions backed by pools of individual home
mortgages." See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Andrew M.
Cuomo, Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark Reform Agreements
with the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008),
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/mediacenter/2008/jun/june5a_08.html
(announcing agreements with the nation's three principal credit rating
agencies and defining mortgage-backed securities); see also Bruce D. Fisher, A
Simple Explanation of Some Legal and Economic Aspects of the Financial
Meltdowns of Banks, MICH. B.J., Mar. 2010, at 38, 41, available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdflpdf4articlel655.pdf (noting that mortgagebacked securities "formed the foundation for this crisis ... [and after) the true
nature of those assets became clear, they declined severely in value, the banks'
lending capacity contracted, and the current financial crisis ensued.").
3. See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Strong Year for Goldman, as It Trims Bonus
Pool,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2010,
at
Bl,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/22goldman.html
(stating that
"[d]espite a record 2009, [Goldman Sachs] announced that it had set aside only
$16.2 billion to reward its employees.") (emphasis added).
4. This may be an overstatement, as many mutual funds invested in assetbacked securities and contributed to the financial crisis, but we will ignore
this fact to foster some sympathy for our protagonist.
5. Robert A. Robertson & Bradley W. Paulson, A Methodology for Mutual
Fund Derivative Investments, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 237 (1995) (stating that
"[riecent events involving the use of derivative investments by mutual funds
have cast some doubt onto a method of investing once considered 'safe,' and
have revealed a need for guidelines on the use of these investments.").
6. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Fed Adds to Its Efforts to Aid Credit
Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.
21,
2008,
at B1,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/economy/22fed.html (stating that
"[flor decades, Americans have considered money-market mutual funds as safe
as bank accounts.").
7. See Richard L. Levine et al., Mutual Fund Market Timing, FED. LAW.,
Jan. 2005, at 28, 30 (stating that though it involves "frequent trading in and
out of a fund to exploit market inefficiencies," market timing is not illegal).
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disfavors market timing because it harms long-term investors. 8
Unfortunately for our underwriter, his mutual fund permits
market timing, and he believes that his sales suffer as a result.
But our underwriter notices a happy mistake in the most
recent draft of his mutual fund's prospectus. Someone (our
underwriter does not know the culprit) included a detailed
description of the mutual fund's prohibition on market timing.
This is included despite the fact that our underwriter knows his
mutual fund actively encourages market timing. Though untrue,
our underwriter suspects that this statement might help his
flagging sales.
While he may lack scruples, our underwriter is not ignorant.
He knows, for example, that Rule 10b-5(b), promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prohibits anyone selling
securities from making untrue statements of material fact.9 He
also knows that this rule has an unsettling and vaguely sinister
reach. Curious of his potential liability, he turns to recent case law
to gauge his concern. To his surprise, a recent ruling in the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gives our underwriter
an opportunity to use the prospectus to sell his shares without
running afoul of Rule 10b-5(b).

In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Tambone, with a
similar set of facts, the First Circuit held that underwriters using
such a misrepresentation are not liable under Rule 1Ob-5(b).1o
Because the underwriters did not draft the prospectus, the First
1
Circuit reasoned that they did not "make" the misrepresentation. '
Rather, the First Circuit held that the underwriters merely used
the misrepresentation, and they could not, therefore, be held liable
under Rule 1Ob-5(b).12
The Tambone majority relied upon statutory construction and
Supreme Court precedent to reach this rather disconcerting
decision. 13 The majority described the Tambone case as "one of
those happy occasions when the language and the structure of a
rule, the statutory framework that it implements, and the
teachings of the Supreme Court coalesce to provide a well-lit
decisional path."14 However, this rather confident characterization
is belied by a lengthy and convincing dissent by Judge Kermit
8. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 439 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that
"[aiccording to the SEC, market timing, though not illegal per se, can harm
other fund investors and, therefore, is commonly barred (or at least restricted)
by those in charge of mutual funds.").
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010).
10. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 449.
11. Id. at 443.
12. Id.
13. See infra Part VI (concluding that the Supreme Court should review the
Tambone decision because the lower court was incorrect in its holding).
14. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 450.
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Lipez.15
This article argues that the Tambone decision unnecessarily
constrains the enforcement powers of the SEC, leaves our
hypothetical underwriter free of liability, provides a perverse
incentive for prospectus drafters to be as poorly informed as
possible, and is contrary to both the intent behind Rule 10b-5(b)
and the current desire to increase regulatory scrutiny of financial
markets. This article also argues that the majority's policy-based
rationale-discouraging frivolous lawsuits-does not justify
limiting the SEC's enforcement power under Rule 10b-5(b). In
order to fully appreciate the decision, Part II defines some
necessary terms, briefly summarizes the SEC's allegations, and
describes the procedural posture of the case. Part III discusses the
Tambone decision, including a detailed analysis of the majority's
justifications and the dissent's rebuttal. Part IV identifies and
discusses the majority's policy reason for the decision: the concern
over frivolous lawsuits. Part V posits that the desire to limit
frivolous lawsuits, however praiseworthy, does not justify
curtailing the enforcement powers of the SEC, and Part VI
concludes with a hypothetical that exposes the potentially
disastrous outcome of this decision.
II. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. TAMBONE

A. Some Necessary Definitions
Before delving into the substance of the Tambone decision, it
is necessary to explore some of the terms used in the complaint.
More specifically, it is important to establish a basic
understanding of mutual funds, the role of underwriters, market
timing, the definition and purpose of a prospectus, and the origin
and content of Rule 10b-5(b).16
1. Mutual Funds and Market Timing
A "mutual fund" is the more common name for a regulated
investment company under the Investment Company Act of
1940.17 The SEC monitors mutual funds for compliance with the
Investment Company Act, 18 and the SEC's website provides the
15. Id. at 453 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
16. Although these are relatively familiar terms, it is important to note that
the crux of this case turned, in part, on the definition of the word "make." See
infra Part III.A (analyzing the various definitions the court came up with for
the word "make").

17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2004).
18. See §§ 80a-2(c), 80a-37(a) (The Commission "is empowered to make
rules and regulations to the same extent, covering the same subject matter,
and for the accomplishment of the same ends as the [Investment Company Act
of 1940]") (internal quotations omitted); see also Jean W. Gleason et al., Fund
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following, attractively succinct, definition:
A mutual fund is a company that brings together money from many
people and invests it in stocks, bonds or other assets. The combined
holdings of stocks, bonds or other assets the fund owns are known as
its portfolio. Each investor in the fund owns shares, which represent
a part of these holdings.' 9
Investment in a mutual fund differs from investment in more
traditional companies. In a more traditional company, a share of
stock represents a proportionate fraction of company ownership,
the value of which is based on the aggregate market price of the
company. 20 Because a mutual fund creates value through
investment in other companies, the value of a mutual fund share
is dependent on the collective value of the mutual fund's
investments. 21 Thus, it is often said that a single mutual fund
share provides access to a diversified investment portfolio without
22
the necessity of purchasing stock from multiple companies.

Director's Guidebook, 52 BUS. LAW. 229, 251 (1996) (noting that "[tihe SEC

actively monitors each fund's operations for compliance with the [Investment
Company Act of 1940], primarily through periodic on-site inspections of the
books and records of the fund and adviser that are required to be maintained
and through review of disclosure documents required to be filed with the SEC.
Inspections for cause may also result from any of a number of events such as
direct receipt by the SEC of an investor complaint, questions presented
through a congressional inquiry, problems raised during SEC review of a
filing, or issues identified by the SEC staff from newspaper articles or
investment company advertisements.").
19. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mutual Fund Definition,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfec/mutual-fund-help.htm (last visited Nov.
19, 2010) (italics in original); see also Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G.
Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a Mutual Fund: Legal and
Practical Considerations, 1612 PLI/CORP 9, 13 (2007) (noting that mutual
funds "are companies that hold pools of portfolio securities (and perhaps other
assets such as options, futures, loans, cash or cash equivalents) and issue
securities that provide investors with an interest in the pool.").
20. A share of corporate stock represents "a proportional part of certain
rights in a corporation during its existence, and in the assets upon
dissolution," and evidence of the stockholder's ratable share in the distribution
of the assets on the winding up of the corporation's business. Dep't of Treasury
of Indiana v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 255, 15 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1938).

21. As described by the Supreme Court, "the business of a mutual fund
consists of buying stock for its own account and of issuing and selling stock or
other securities evidencing an undivided and redeemable interest in the assets
of the fund." Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 (1971) (internal
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 697-98 (1975) (noting that a mutual fund "invests in the
securities of other corporations and issues securities of its own. Shares in [a
mutual fund] thus represent proportionate interests in its investment
portfolio, and their value fluctuates in relation to the changes in value of the
securities it owns.").
22. 2 DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH MORGAN SCHURIG, ASSET
PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS § 28:101
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More importantly, mutual fund shares differ from those of
more traditional companies because there is no secondary market
for mutual funds. 23 In other words, an investor wishing to sell
mutual fund stock does not have the right to sell the share to
another investor. Instead, a holder of mutual fund stock must
tender the share to the mutual fund for a price equal to the net
asset value at the time of redemption. 24 The determination of the
net asset value of a mutual fund share is calculated by
determining the aggregate value of the mutual fund's
investments. 25 Although comprised of a number of securities, the
values of which ebb and flow over the course of a trading day, the
net asset value of a mutual fund (and, therefore, the value of a
share of a mutual fund) remains fixed for that day. 26
Market timing is an investment strategy that takes
advantage of the time delay in mutual-fund pricing. 27 Through
(2008) (stating that, in a mutual fund, "individual investors with mutual
investment objectives . . . pool their resources in order to take advantage of the
resulting economies of scale and diminished risk through diversification.").
23. Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC's Repeated
Unnecessary Attacks on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1509,
1542 (2008) (noting that "shares of mutual funds are bought and sold back to
the fund itself and are not traded on a secondary market exchange.").
24. See Gleason et al., supra, note 18 at 251 (stating that "[m]utual funds
continuously offer their shares and are obligated, upon presentation to the
fund, to redeem the shares for current net asset value within seven days after
tender of the shares.").
25. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and
Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 97 (2009) (stating that "[tihe value of the mutual fund is determined
every day by calculating the value of each of the fund's investments; the value
of each investor's shares, referred to as the "Net Asset Value"...
is then the
mutual fund value divided by the number of outstanding shares in the mutual
fund. Each share owned by an investor can be sold back to the mutual fund for
the [net asset value]. Likewise, new or additional investments in the mutual
fund are made by buying shares in the mutual fund at the appropriate [net
asset value]."). Or, in the less transparent language of the Investment
Company Act, shares of a mutual fund can only be sold and redeemed at a
price that
bear[s] such relation to the current net asset value of such security ...
for the purpose of eliminating or reducing . .. any dilution of the value of
other outstanding securities of such company or any other result of such
purchase, redemption or sale which is unfair to holders of such other
outstanding securities.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (2006).
26. DH2, Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 422 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that
"[a] mutual fund's share price does not fluctuate throughout the trading day,
but the prices of the securities held by the fund do. The ever-changing portfolio
security prices are aggregated into a single daily fund price known as the net
asset value.. . , which is generally fixed by a fund when the major U.S. stock
markets close.").
27. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1453 (2006)
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market timing, an investor exploits the fact that the portfolio stock
prices used to set a mutual fund's net asset value change after the
net asset value is established. 28 To engage in this practice, also
known as "time zone arbitrage," an investor trades on knowledge
known but not yet reflected by the markets. 29 This is most likely to
occur when a mutual fund contains securities traded on markets
that span several time zones.30 For example, if a mutual fund's
investment portfolio contains securities traded in both New York
and London exchanges, an investor in New York could know the
closing price of a security traded in London about four hours before
the close of the New York exchange.31 Because the value of a
mutual fund is calculated using the closing prices of the securities
in their respective exchanges, an investor savvy in foreign markets
could buy or sell mutual fund shares based on the anticipated
price changes due to economic news not accounted for in a mutual
fund's net asset value. 32
(stating that "the term 'market-timing' has no fixed definition in the extensive
investment advisory literature and regulations. As investigations by the SEC
and others evolved, however, regulators eventually made clear that the
market-timing of which they disapproved encompassed a variety of investing
techniques involving arbitrage of mutual fund share prices through the use of
timed transactions.").
28. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 637, n.4 (2006)
(describing "market timing" as "exploit(ing] brief discrepancies between the
stock prices used to calculate the . . . value [of the mutual fund shares] once a
day, and the prices at which those stocks are actually trading in the interim.").
29. S.E.C. v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that
"[mlarket timers typically buy and sell shares of a mutual fund quickly to take
advantage of minute, short-term differentials between a fund's value and the
value of the securities it holds.").
30. As described by the SEC in a Congressional report, "[miutual funds that
invest in overseas securities markets are particularly vulnerable to market
timers" who could buy or sell "fund shares based on events occurring after
foreign market closing prices are established .

. . ,

but before the events have

been reflected in the fund's" net asset value. Brief for the Securities and
Exchange Commission at 10-11, S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir.
2008) (No. 07-1834), 2007 WL 7076123.
31. DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 593, n.1 (stating that "[t]he potential for
exploiting stale market prices increases as one moves east, given the larger
time zone disparities between eastern time and the Japanese or Hong Kong
markets."); see also Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders?ArbitrageProofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245, 246 (2003) (stating that
"[i]nvestors can take advantage of mutual funds that calculate their [net asset
values] using stale closing prices by trading based on recent market
movements. For example, if the U.S. market has risen since the close of
overseas equity markets, investors can expect that overseas markets will open
higher the following morning. Investors can buy a fund with a stale-price [net
asset value] for less than its current value, and they can likewise sell a fund
for more than its current value on a day that the U.S. market has fallen.").
32. See Levin et al., supra note 7, at 30 (stating that "market-timers
purchase or sell shares of mutual funds at the to-be-calculated but effectively
'stale' NAV in an attempt to benefit from the anticipated adjustment in the
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Such a practice, although not specifically barred by rule or
law,33 has been recognized by the SEC as harmful to mutual fund
investors that do not engage in market timing. 34 The frequent
trading by market timers increases transaction costs at the
expense of long-term investors.3 5 In recognition of this harm, the
SEC proposed a rule that requires mutual funds "to disclose in
their prospectuses . . . the risks . . . of the frequent purchase and
redemption of investment company shares, and the . . . policies

and procedures with respect to such frequent purchases and
redemptions."36 The proposal does not, however, indicate that
market timing is illegal, and although some mutual funds have
taken steps to prohibit market timing, 37 the practice continues to
be an issue. 38

price of the foreign securities at their opening the next day.
); see also
DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 593 (noting that those that practice market timing
"make profits with slight risk to themselves, diverting gains from the mutual
funds' long-term investors while imposing higher administrative costs on the
funds (whose operating expenses rise with each purchase and redemption)."
(quoting Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005))).
33. See Levine et al., supra note 7, at 30 (stating that "no rule, regulation,
or common law prohibits market timing.").
34. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 439 (stating that "[a]ccording to the SEC,
market timing, though not illegal per se, can harm other fund investors and,
therefore, is commonly barred (or at least restricted) by those in charge of
mutual funds.").
35. Gann, 565 F.3d at 935 (noting that mutual funds "object that market
timers' gains come at the expense of long-term investors and increase
transaction costs, so such companies employ a number of strategies to discover
and impede traders engaging in the practice.").
36. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of
Portfolio Hearing, 68 Fed. Reg. 70402-01 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003).
37. See Gann, 565 F.3d at 935 (stating that "[b]rokers who time the market
sometimes receive 'block notices' from funds in which they have bought and
sold shares. A block notice typically informs the broker that he has run afoul
of a fund's restrictions and bars specified accounts controlled by the broker
from future trades. Brokers can be identified by their registered
representative number; clients can be identified by their account number or
numbers. A block notice might bar trades under the broker's number, the
client's account number, or the number attached to a brokerage or its branch
office."). But see Zitzewitz, supra note 31, at 245-46 (stating that "[d]espite the
fact that this arbitrage opportunity has been understood by the industry for 20
years and heavily exploited since at least 1998, the fund industry was still
taking only limited action to protect its long-term shareholders as of late
2002.").
38. See Zitzewitz, supra note 32, at 245 (noting that "[d]espite ... pressure
from the Securities and Exchange Commission ... ,the vast majority of funds
are not market-updating their prices to eliminate [net asset value]
predictability and dilution, but are instead pursuing solutions that are only
partly effective.").
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Underwritersand Prospectuses

Generally, an underwriter is any party that purchases
securities from an issuer in connection with the issuer's
distribution of such securities.39 In basic terms, an underwriter
matches buyers with sellers. 40 Responsible for the pricing,4 1 the
sale, 42 and the general organization of an issuance, the
underwriter plays a vital role in a securities offering.
Often, the underwriter serves as the primary point of contact
for investors. It has been suggested that investors seek out the
underwriter not only because of the underwriter's relationship
with the issuer, 43 but also because an underwriter's raison d'6tre is
the evaluation of securities and their issuers.44 On a more
practical level, an investor might find comfort in the knowledge
that the underwriter's profit is often linked to the success of the
issuer. 45
39. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(11) (2000) (defining an underwriter as "any
person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for
an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or
has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates
or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking."); see also Eric Seitz, Underwriter Due Diligence: "It's [Not] a
Whole New Ballgame," 61 SMU L. REV. 1633, 1638 (2008) (stating that "[i]n a
securities offering, the basic role of an underwriter is to act as an intermediary
between the issuer and the investor.").
40. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (defining an underwriter as a person who "buys securities directly or
indirectly from the issuer and resells them to the public, or [ performs some
act (or acts) that facilitates the issuer's distribution." (quoting Ingenito v.
Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1977))).

41. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 724 (2005) (stating that "the underwriter has primary
responsibility for pricing the IPO shares and for distributing them.").
42. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating
that "[t]he sale of fund shares to new investors is generally the responsibility
of a 'principal underwriter' who is usually the adviser itself or a close
affiliate.").
43. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1070 (7th Cir. 1975)
(noting that "[a]n underwriter's relationship with the issuer gives the
underwriter access to facts that are not equally available to members of the
public who must rely on published information.").
44. Katina J. Dorton, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA.
L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1985) ("An issuer is only an occasional participant in the
capital markets, but underwriters have frequent, direct contact with the
markets and have developed an expertise in pricing securities."); see also
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir.
1973) (noting that an underwriter "is most heavily relied upon to verify
published materials because of his expertise in appraising the securities issue
and the issuer, and because of his incentive to do so. He is familiar with the
process of investigating the business condition of a company and possesses
extensive resources for doing so.").
45. See Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 370 (noting the underwriter "often has a
financial stake in the issue," and thus "has a special motive to thoroughly
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Due to the unique role of underwriters in securities issuances
and the fact that they are privy to facts and data unavailable to
the investing public, courts have imposed a duty upon
underwriters to make an appropriate investigation into the
offering 46 and the issuer. 47 As stated rather succinctly by an
Alabama district court, underwriters are "under a duty to the
investing public to make a reasonable investigation of the issuer. .
. and to disclose material facts that he knew or that were readily
ascertainable."48 Generally, this investigation must be vigorous
enough to provide a reasonable person with confidence that the
statements in the sales materials are true and comprehensive.4 9
This investigation involves more than merely relying on the
issuer's attestation; an underwriter must take affirmative steps to
test the veracity of the statements in the sales materials,
otherwise known as the prospectus. 0
In basic terms, a prospectus is a document used by
underwriters to sell a security. The Securities Exchange Act
defines "prospectus" broadly to include any writing "which offers

investigate the issuer's strengths and weaknesses.").
46. See id. (noting that "[p]rospective investors look to the underwriter-a
fact well known to all concerned and especially to the underwriter-to pass on
the soundness of the security and the correctness of the registration statement
and prospectus."). See generally 3B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 12:42 (2d ed. 2003)
(noting the underwriter's significant role); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96
(2d Cir. 1969) (explaining that a securities dealer has a special relationship
with a buyer to make decisions based on accurate information and not "accept
blind recommendations.").
47. See Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1070 (stating that "the relationship between
the underwriter and its customers implicitly involves a favorable
recommendation of the issued security. Because the public relies on the
integrity, independence and expertise of the underwriter, the underwriter's
participation significantly enhances the marketability of the security. And
since the underwriter is unquestionably aware of the nature of the public's
reliance on his participation in the sale of the issue, the mere fact that he has
underwritten it is an implied representation that he has met the standards of
his profession in his investigation of the issuer.") (citations omitted).
48. Shores v. M.E. Ratliff Inv. Co., No. CA 77-G-0604-S, 1982 WL 1559, at
*3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 1982).
49. SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc. 254 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26100, 41 SEC
Docket 1131 (Sept. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 240748, at *20); see also Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that an
underwriter has a duty to investigate, and recognizing further that an
underwriter may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for reckless failure to investigate).
50. See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that "[t]o effectuate the statute's purpose the phrase
'reasonable investigation' must be construed to require more effort on the part
of the underwriters than the mere accurate reporting in the prospectus of 'date
presented' to them by the company . . .. [Underwriters] may not rely solely on
the company's officers or on the company's counsel.").
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any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."5 1 A
prospectus contains general information about the offering,
including issuer representations, the security's cost, potential risks
of the investment, and the issuer's past performance. 52 Although
this description appears pleasantly pro-investor, commentators
have criticized prospectuses as unduly protracted, complicated,
and mind-numbing documents. 53 Indeed, it has been suggested
that the prospectus disclosures are "boring intentionally, word
analgesics to numb anxious buyers and sellers."54 Regardless of its
efficacy, a prospectus includes important representations about
the issuer and its business and is the only document required to be
given to investors.55
3.

Rule 10b-5(b)

Rule 10b-5(b) of the Securities Exchange Act generally
prohibits the use of misstatements in the sale of securities.5 6 The
rule, in relevant part, states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly,

. .

. [t]o make any untrue statement

51. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(10) (2000).
52. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS
§ 3:3.1 3-16 (4th ed. 2005) (detailing the elements of a prospectus); see also
Securities and Exchange Commission, Prospectus Definition,
U.S.
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/prospectus-help.htm (last visited Nov.
19, 2010) (defining a prospectus and providing information on how to obtain a
prospectus).
53. See, e.g., Registration Form Used by Open-End Management
Investment Companies, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916 (June 1, 1998) (to be codified at 17
274),
available at
240,
270,
232,
239,
pts.
230,
C.F.R.
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7512r.htm#body4 (noting that "[m]any have
criticized fund prospectuses finding them unintelligible, tedious, and
legalistic."). See also Daniel D. Bradlow & Jay Gary Finkelstein, TrainingLaw
Students to be International Transactional Lawyers-Using an Extended
Simulation to Educate Law Students About Business Transactions, 1 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 67, 69 (2007) (noting that "[a] securities prospectus
is an extraordinarily complex document-and one of the most boring . . . .").
But see Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 843 (2000) (stating that "[plerhaps
surprisingly, investors consult the prospectus more than any other source of
information about the mutual funds that they buy.").
54. KURT ANDERSEN, TURN OF THE CENTURY 430 (Random House, 1999).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2004) (declaring that it is unlawful for any
person "to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale,
unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus."). See also Kwang-Rok Kim,
The Electronic Disclosure System in the Korean Securities Market: What Do
You File on the DART System in Korea?, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 597, 610
(2004) (noting that because "a prospectus contains very important information
needed to make investment decisions, the U.S. federal securities laws prohibit
transactions of securities if a prospectus is not first delivered to the
investors.").
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010).
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of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."5 7 To
deduce the rule's intent, it is illuminating to examine its origin.
Although Rule lOb-5(b) is one of the SEC's primary tools in
the regulation of today's intricate securities transactions, the
language of the rule was born out of a desire to stop a stunningly
simple fraud.5 8 Milton Freeman worked for a nascent SEC in the
early 1940s5 9 and was one of the authors of Rule 1Ob-5(b).6o A
colleague told Mr. Freeman that a company officer was purposely
devaluing his company's stock in order to purchase the stock at an
artificially low price. 61 Recounting the birth of Rule 10b-5(b) in
almost comic detail, Mr. Freeman stated:
I called the Commission and . . . got on the calendar, and I don't

remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We
passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who
said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how
it happened. 62
This rather romantic reminiscence illustrates the simplicity of
the rule's intent: to protect investors from corporate fraud. Indeed,
early interpretations allowed the rule to reach virtually any
conduct that resulted in a fraud upon investors.63
B. SEC v. Tambone: The Parties
Tambone involved a registered broker-dealer called Columbia
Funds Distributor, Inc. ("Distributor"). 64 James Tambone was a copresident of Distributor and Robert Hussey was a managing
57. Id.
58. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 916
(1967).
59. Id. at 891.
60. Id. at 922 (describing, with an unabashed hubris, that Rule 10b-5 is

"the biggest thing that had ever happened".
61. Freeman, supra note 59, at 922 (recalling that "the president of some
company in Boston .. . [was] going around buying up the stock of his company
from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he [was] telling [the
shareholders] that the company [was] doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the
earnings [were expected ] to be quadrupled and [the price of the stock would]
be $2.00 a share for this coming year.").
62. Id. The amusingly superfluous aside as to whether the Commission met
"that morning or after lunch" is included to emphasize the iconic position that
the rule has assumed.
63. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (noting that

Rule 10b-5(b) "could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material
misstatement or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the effect of
defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.").
64. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 438.
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director.65 The First Circuit goes through great pains to describe
the "tangled web of interlocking entities" at issue in this case, but
the only entities germane to the discussion are Distributor,
Columbia Management Group ("Management") and Columbia
Management Advisors, Inc. ("Advisors").66 Distributor, a whollyowned subsidiary of Management, acted as an underwriter by
selling shares and distributing prospectuses for over 140 mutual
funds.67 Such prospectuses, and the representations therein, were
drafted by employees of Advisors.68 There was no allegation by the
SEC that either Mr. Tambone or Mr. Hussey were employees of
either Management or Advisors during the relevant time period. 69
C. Facts and ProceduralPosture
The SEC alleged that, despite a representation in the

prospectus to the contrary, 70 the Columbia family of mutual funds
allowed market timing and that Tambone and Hussey
intentionally used this falsehood to sell shares in violation of Rule
10b-5(b).71 The SEC also charged the defendants with breaching
an implied representation that they had a reasonable basis to
believe that the prospectus was accurate and complete. 72
At district court, the defendants were granted a motion to
dismiss based on a lack of the particularity requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 73 and a failure to state a claim.74 On

65. Id. at 439.
66. Id. at 438.
67. Id. at 439.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Complaint at 13, SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (D. Mass. 2006),
(No. 06-10885 NMG), 2006 WL 1726133 (quoting a disclosure used in a
number of prospectuses). The disclosure states:
The Fund does not permit short-term or excessive trading in its shares.
Excessive purchases, redemptions or exchanges of Fund shares disrupt
portfolio management and increase Fund expenses. In order to promote
the best interests of the Fund, the Fund reserves the right to reject any
purchase order or exchange request particularly from market timers or
investors who, in the advisor's opinion, have a pattern of short-term or
excessive trading or whose trading has been or may be disruptive to the
Fund.
Id.
71. Brief for SEC, supra note 30, at 2 (alleging that the defendants
"marketed and sold fund shares by means of the misleading prospectuses,
allowing the prospectuses to be disseminated and referring clients .. . to the
prospectuses for information on the funds.").
72. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 440.
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
74. SEC v. Tambone, 473 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding
that the defendants could not be held liable as primary violators for
misstatements that the defendants did not draft).
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appeal, a divided panel of the First Circuit reversed in part,
holding that the SEC properly alleged that Tambone and Hussey
made false statements.75 The defendants petitioned for, and were
granted, en banc review on the Rule 10b-5(b) claim by the First
Circuit. 76
III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S HOLDING, ITS RATIONALE, AND A REBUTTAL

The majority opinion in Tambone, drafted by Judge Bruce M.
Selya, ultimately held that the SEC's interpretation of Rule 10b5(b) was untenable.77 To reach this conclusion, the majority held
that the definition of "make" in Rule 10b-5(b) was too narrow to
encompass the defendants' acts, and that a breach of an
underwriter's implied duty did not give rise to primary liability
under Rule 10b-5(b).78 As discussed below, however, the majority's
arguments are dissected, point-by-point, by Judge Kermit Lipez's
persuasive dissent.
A. The Definition of "Make" in Rule 10b-5(b)
The core inquiry in Tambone, as framed by the majority, is
whether Tambone and Hussey made untrue statements within the
meaning of Rule 10b-5(b).79 Asserting that the crucial word in Rule
10b-5(b) is "make," the majority set out to test the SEC's proposed
definition.80 Although it has been said that "[n]o honest and
reasonable citizen could have difficulty in understanding the
meaning of 'untrue,' 'material fact,' 'any omission to state a
material fact,' 'in light of the circumstances under which they were
made,' or 'misleading,"' the majority found it necessary to define
"make."8 1 To divine the word's definition, the majority applied
three traditional methods of statutory construction: determination
of the ordinary meaning of the word, 82 analysis of the structure of
Rule 10b,83 and review of Supreme Court precedent.
75. SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 135 (1st Cir. 2008).
76. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 441.
77. Id. at 450.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 442.
80. See id. (declaring "make" the "pivotal word"). The majority's definitional
odyssey reminds the author of President Bill Clinton's famous quote that his
answer "depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." See Kenneth Starr,
A Referral to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to Title 28,
United States Code, § 595(c), H. R. Doc. 105-310, at 125, n.1091 (1998).
81. See United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting
Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1937)).
82. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) ("When a word is not
defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or
natural meaning.").
83. Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) (stating
that "the second subparagraph of [Rule 10b] specifies the making of an untrue
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The OrdinaryMeaning of "Make"

Faced with an undefined term in a statute, the majority
followed the traditional rule of statutory construction of resorting
to the word's ordinary meaning. 84 To do this, the majority
consulted dictionary definitions, 85 noting that Black's Law
Dictionary's definition of "make" is to "cause (something) to exist"
and that Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
"make" as to "create [or] cause."86 Using these references, the
majority settled on a definition that stressed the actual creation of
the misstatement,8 7 and was quick to emphasize that the
Commission's proposed definition of "make"-something akin to
"delivery"-conflicted with this definition.88
The majority confirmed this definition by examining the use
of other verbs in Rule 10b. The majority found the verb used in
Rule 10b-5(a) illuminating. Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits the
"employ[ment]" of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.8 9
Characterizing "employ" as more expansive than "make," a
characterization that itself is dubious,9 0 the majority held that the
drafters deliberately chose a more narrow verb for of Rule 10b5(b). 91 The implication is that had the drafters of Rule 10b-5(b)
used the word "employ" rather than "make," the Commission's

statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact. The first
and third paragraphs are not so restricted.").
84. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,
252 (2004) (stating that "[sltatutory construction must begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."
(quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985))). See also In re Hill, 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that, in
general, words in a statute carry their ordinary meanings if not specially
defined).
85. See Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 2007), (stating that
the court "follow[s] the common practice of consulting dictionary definitions to
clarify their ordinary meaning [ ] and look to how the terms were defined at
the time [the statute] was adopted." (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. TRW Rifle 7.62X51mm
Caliber, 447 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 2006))).
86. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 443 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICT.
1363 (2002); BLACK'S LAW DICT. 1041 (9th ed. 2009)).
87. It is important to note, however, that the majority was careful to state:
"This case does not require us to set forth a comprehensive test for
determining when a speaker may be said to have made a statement." Id. at
443.
88. Id. ("It is enough to say that the SEC's purported reading of the word is
inconsistent with each of these definitions.").
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010).
90. See generally infra Part III.A.1.
91. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 443 (citing the rule's [10(b)] grant to the SEC of
"broad authority to proscribe conduct that 'use[s] or employ[s]' any
'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."').
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allegations might have been appropriate. However, according to
the majority, to adopt the Commission's interpretation of "make"
would be to ignore the difference between "employ" and the
"significantly different (and narrower) verb contained in Rule 10b5(b)."92 The majority stated, in a moment of hyperbolic
condescension, that "[w]ord choices have consequences, and this
word choice virtually leaps off the page." 93 Suggesting that the
Commission's definition would overstep the intended regulatory
reach of Rule 10b-5(b), 94 the majority refused to entertain the
Commission's proposed definition of "make."9 5
In dissent, Judge Lipez pointed out that the majority was
perhaps a bit too selective in the chosen definitions of "make."
Hinting that the majority took an ultra-literal approach, 96 the
dissent asserted that "it defies ordinary experience to say that a
statement can only be 'made' by the physical or manual act of
writing or transcribing or speaking words."9 7
To support the claim that it is common to say that one
"makes" a statement through conduct, the dissent highlighted
dictionary definitions of "make" that do not exclusively refer to
acts of creation.98 For example, The Random House Dictionary
defines "make" to include acts such as "delivering" and "putting
forth."9 9 If the majority were to have used this definition, the
SEC's allegation that the defendants made the misrepresentation
by delivering the prospectus would be credible. 0 0
Rather than merely suggesting an alternate definition, the
dissent forwarded a rather convincing reason to use this definition:
precedent. The dissent cites the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Reass v. United States, which held
that a statute's reference to "making" a false statement should
encompass not only the composition of the statement, but also the
communication of the statement.' 0 ' Thus, the majority's definition
92. Id. (characterizing the difference as "obvious").
93. Id.
94. See id. (refusing to permit the administrative rule to sweep more
broadly than its language permits).
95. Id. at 447. (noting that the SEC's "attempt to impute statements to
persons who may not have had any role in their creation, composition, or
preparation falls well short.").
96. See id. at 458 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that "the statutory
language [of Rule 10b-5(b)] is broad enough to encompass less literal forms of
'making' a statement.").
97. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. O'Neil, 135 P. 60, 63
(1913)).
98. Id.
99. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 458 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1161 (2d ed. 1987)).
100. Id.
101. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 458 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (interpreting the
word "make" in a federal mortgage fraud statute to include "communicating
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of "make" is arguably too narrow, and there is persuasive (albeit
nonbinding) authority supporting the SEC's suggested
definition. 102
2. Defining "Make" through Examination of the Structure and
Intent of Rule 1Ob-5
Not content to rely upon a selectively-chosen dictionary
definition of "make," the First Circuit majority examined the
statute that Rule 10b-5(b) drafters used as a model: section 17(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act.103 Section 17(a) states, in relevant
part, that it is illegal to "obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact." 104 The court noted the
difference between this language and Rule 10b-5(b), stating that
"the drafters of Rule 10b-5 had before them language that would
have covered the 'use' of an untrue statement of material fact,"
and that the authors of Rule 10b-5 "easily could have copied that
language."105 The result of this difference, according to the
majority, is that Rule 10b-5(b) was deliberately drafted in a more
restrictive manner to encompass a more narrow family of
activities. 106
In dissent, Judge Lipez noted that the majority's
interpretation failed to give proper deference to the intent of the
drafters of Rule 1Ob-5(b).10o Regardless of the rule's predecessor,
the SEC's interpretation of the word "make" is necessary to "fulfill
the objective of Congress and the Commission to punish 'any
untrue statement of a material fact' made with knowledge or
reckless disregard for its truth."10 8 The dissent argued that if an
[the statement] and not merely composing" the statement. (quoting Reass v.
United States, 99 F.2d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 1938))).
102. See id. (noting that "the fact remains that the [Fourth Circuit] did not
confine 'making a statement' to the literal meaning on which the majority
insists.").
103. See Persky, 520 F.2d at 287 (citing Hooper v. Mountain States
Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201, n.4 (5th Cir. 1960) (noting that Section
17(a) "is almost identical to, and indeed was the model for, Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.").
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2010).
105. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 464. The court suggests, it would seem, a Rule
10b-5(b) that would read as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading ....
Id. at 444, n.5 (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 434 (noting that "the drafters-who faithfully tracked section
17(a) in other respects-deliberately eschewed the expansive language of
section 17(a)(2).").
107. Id. at 459 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (quoting Rule 10b-5(b)).
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underwriter delivers a prospectus to investors with the knowledge
that it contains a misstatement, it "takes no stretch of the
language of Rule 10b-5(b) to view such an underwriter as having
attested to the accuracy of the prospectus contents."1 09 Although
admitting that the rule "contemplates some range of conduct
narrower than the statute's all-encompassing 'use or employ,"' the
dissent stressed that this does not foreclose the possibility "that
particular uses of statements by particular players in the sale of
securities . . . constitute the 'making' of implied statements." 0

Thus, the majority allowed a rather pedantic examination of Rule
10b-5(b)'s predecessor to trump the intent of the rule.
3.

Supreme Court Precedent and "Primary"vs. "Secondary"
Liability under Rule 10b-5

After satisfying itself that both the ordinary dictionary
meaning of "make" and the statute's use of more expansive verbs
were contrary to the SEC's proposed definition, the majority
argued that Supreme Court cases were in conflict with the SEC's
interpretation.1 11 The majority noted that the Supreme Court has
not addressed the question of the definition of the word "make" in
Rule 10b-5(b), but stated that the SEC's definition would cause
tension in the Supreme Court's rulings regarding primary and
secondary liability under Rule lOb-5(b).11 2
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of

Denver, N.A., the Supreme Court established a private right of
action under Rule 10b against "primary" (as opposed to
"secondary") violators of securities laws.118 In the context of Rule
10b, a primary violator is the party responsible for the
misrepresentation or untrue statement, and a secondary violator
would be any party that, for example, aids or abets in the making
of the misrepresentation or untrue statement." 4
In Central Bank, a public building authority issued bonds to
finance a public improvement project."15 The value of the bonds
dramatically decreased, and several bondholders sued a number of
109. Id. at 459 (Lipez, J., dissenting). The dissent continues to state that,
through such delivery, the underwriters "have knowingly 'made' an impliedfalse-statement to investors that the prospectus accurately describes the
fund's risks." Id. ("By [an underwriter's] recommendation he implies that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on
the conclusions based on such investigation." (quoting Hanly, 415 F.2d at
597)).
110. Id. at 459 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
111. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 443.
112. Id.
113. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 191.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 167.
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parties under Rule 10b-5.116 Rule 10b-5(a), in relevant part, makes
it unlawful to "directly or indirectly . . . use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."1 7 The plaintiffs
argued that the "directly or indirectly" language of Rule 10b-5
should extend to cover parties that aid and abet the employment of
a manipulative or deceptive device.118 After review of the statutory
language, the Central Bank court disagreed, noting that the
"directly or indirectly" language does not give rise to aiding and
abetting liability.119 The court reasoned that to impose such
liability on parties who give "a degree of aid" to primary violators
would reach parties outside the intended penumbra of the rule.120
The Tambone majority held that the SEC's interpretation of
Rule 10b-5(b) was contrary to Central Bank.121 Although the
majority acknowledged that Central Bank did not address the
definition of "make" in Rule 10b-5, the majority viewed Central
Bank as relevant. The majority's concern was that the SEC's
interpretation would obscure the Supreme Court's distinction
between primary and secondary liability.122 Noting that "courts
must be vigilant to ensure that secondary violations are not
shoehorned into the category reserved for primary violations," the
majority held that the SEC's proposed interpretation would
impermissibly extend primary liability of Rule lOb-5(b).1 23 Quoting
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
majority concluded that "[i]f Central Bank is to have any real
meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading
statement in order to be held liable [as a primary violator] under
section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and

116. Id. at 168.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 164).
118. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 164.
119. Id. at 176 (noting that "federal courts have not relied on the 'directly or
indirectly' language when imposing aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b)
120. See id. (stating that "[w]hen Congress wished to provide a remedy to
those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so
expressly." (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
734 (1975))).
121. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 445-46 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Commission's interpretation would be "in tension with Supreme Court
precedent" and that "[a]llowing the SEC to blur the line between primary and
secondary violations in this manner would be unfaithful to the taxonomy of
Central Bank.").
122. Id. at 446 ("The SEC's position poses a threat to the integrity of [the
primary and secondary] dichotomy.").
123. See id. (stating that "[r]eading 'make' to include the use of a false
statement by one other than the maker would extend primary liability beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the text of Rule 10b-5(b)." (citing Cent.
Bank, 511 U.S. at 188)).
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abetting."124
The dissent found the majority's reliance on Central Bank
misplaced. Before tackling the substance of the argument, the
dissent noted that Central Bank's holding was concerned with a
suit brought by a private plaintiff, not the SEC.125 The majority's
decision, therefore, ignored the fact that the core issue of the
Tarbone case involves the SEC's authority to bring claims.126
Central Bank settles the question of whether a private party can
bring a Rule 10b-5(b) claim against aiders and abettors.1 27 Central
Bank does not, however, settle the question of whether the SEC
can bring a Rule 10b-5(b) claim against them.
Further, by exaggerating the holding of Central Bank, the
dissent charged the majority with artificially extending the case's
reach. 128 The Central Bank decision only addressed the question of
whether Rule 10b extends to those secondary actors that aid and
abet a primary violation.129 The issue in front of the Tambone
court, however, did not involve aiding and abetting. Rather, the
issue was whether Tambone and Hussey were primary violators of
Rule

lOb-5(b).13o

Thus,

the

primary/secondary

dichotomy

established in Central Bank is not threatened by the SEC's
proposed interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b), and the basis of the
majority's holding is questionable.131
124. Id. at 447 (quoting Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997)).
125. Id. at 445.
126. Id. ("Although the [Central Bank] Court focused on the text of the
provisions, it also emphasized the element of reliance (which was not satisfied
in that case), as well as a set of policy considerations that arise exclusively in
the context of private securities litigation." (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at
173-78, 180, 188-89)).
127. Id. ("Indeed, the Court has consistently distinguished between the
broad contours of the SEC's 'express statutory authority to enforce [Rule 10b5],' and the 'narrow dimensions of the implied right of action." (quoting Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79-81 (2006); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008))); see also
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (stating that "[t]o effectuate its
remedial purposes, the [Securities Exchange] Act should be construed flexibly,
not technically and restrictively.").
128. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 454 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the
majority's argument "overstates the substance" of Cent. Bank).
129. Id. (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167).
130. Id. at 455 (Lipez, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the issue is not
secondary liability, but rather "whether the defendants' acts are 'sufficient to
show that they made the [alleged] material misstatements and omissions ...
such that they can be held primarily liable."' Id. (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008)). The dissent
specifically framed the issue as "whether the defendants themselves 'engage[d]
in the manipulative or deceptive practice."' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1258).
131. See id. at 456 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue before the
court is not the primary/secondary dichotomy, but rather "whether the
defendants have 'made' a statement, which unquestionably would subject
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B. The Implied Statement Theory
As noted above, the SEC did not assert that the defendants
drafted the misrepresentations in the prospectus. Rather, the SEC
alleged that Tambone and Hussey, by delivering the prospectus to
investors, implied that the statements in the prospectus were true
and complete.132 This implied statement theory is based on an
underwriter's duty to investigate the nature and circumstances of
an offering. 133 The Tambone majority dismissed the possibility of
any implied statements by the defendants, noting that the SEC's
interpretation would create "mischief' by creating a burdensome
duty for underwriters.134 However, as argued by the dissent, this
duty is not unprecedented and deserves proper deference."a5
1. The Breach of the Implied Duty of Underwriters
The SEC asserted that Tambone and Hussey should be held
primarily liable for their "implied, but false, representations to
investors as to the accuracy of the disclosures made in the
prospectuses.""s6 To back up this claim, the Commission cited the
duty of underwriters to conduct a reasonable investigation 37 and
argued that an underwriter's recommendation of a security
implies that the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in
the accuracy of the material representations in a prospectus." 8 To
bolster this argument, the SEC cited Seventh Circuit,1s9 Eighth
Circuit, 14 0 and Ninth Circuit 41 decisions.142 The SEC argued that
them to primary liability.").
132. See Brief for SEC, supra note 30, at 26 (stating that "as securities
professionals directing the offer and sale of shares on behalf of the
underwriter; Tambone and Hussey made their own implied (but false)
representation to investors that they had a reasonable basis for a belief that
the key representations in the prospectuses were truthful and complete.").
133. See Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 857 (citing Hanly, 415 F.2d at
595-96) (stating that "[a] securities professional has an obligation to
investigate the securities he or she offers to customers.").
134. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 447.
135. Id. at 455 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
136. Brief for SEC, supra note 30, at 37.
137. See id. (stating that "[a]n underwriter by participating in an offering
constructively represents that statements made in the registration materials
are complete and accurate. The investing public properly relies upon the
underwriter to check the accuracy of the statements and the soundness of the
offer; when the underwriter does not speak out, the investor reasonably
assumes that there are no disclosed material deficiencies." (quoting ChrisCraft, 480 F.2d at 370)).
138. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37778-01 (Sept. 22, 1988).
139. See Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1070 (stating that "[t]he relationship between
the underwriter and its customers implicitly involves a favorable
recommendation of the issued security.").
140. Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 922 (8th
Cir. 1977) ("[B]y holding the notes out as being creditworthy, Goldman Sachs
represented that it had made a thorough investigation on which it based its
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this implied duty prevents an underwriter from both "deliberately
ignor[ing]" facts that he has a duty to know and "recklessly
stat[ing] facts about matters of which he is ignorant."143 An
underwriter, according to the SEC, must "analyze sales literature
and must not blindly accept recommendations made therein."144
2. Chiarella v. United States
Although recognizing an underwriter's duty to investigate the
nature and circumstances of an offering, the First Circuit majority
held that this implied duty does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that an underwriter "makes" a representation to
investors that all the statements in the prospectus are true and
complete.145 Such an interpretation, according to the majority,
"would be tantamount to imposing a free-standing and
unconditional duty to disclose" and would be contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. 146 To support this claim, the majority cited the
Supreme Court's holding in Chiarellav. United States.14 7
In Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer, privy to
corporate takeover bids printed by his employer, used this
knowledge to purchase stock of potential targets.148 The employee
sold the stock for a profit once the takeover attempts were made
public. 149 The employee was indicted, in part, for violation of
RulelOb-5.150 The Supreme Court held that the employee was not
liable under the rule, noting that "one who fails to disclose
material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
recommendation.").
141. See Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 857-58 (noting that underwriters
have "a duty to make an investigation that would provide [the underwriter]
with a reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the
statements provided to the investors were truthful and complete.").
142. Brief for SEC, supra note 30, at 37-40.
143. Id. at 39.
144. See id. at 39, n.18 (stating that an underwriter "cannot recommend a
security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for such
recommendation. He must disclose facts which he knows and those which are
reasonably ascertainable. By his recommendation, he implies that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on
the conclusions based on such investigation." (quoting Harity v. S.E.C., 415
F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969))).
145. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442 (citing Dain Rauscher,Inc., 254 F.3d at 857).

146. Id.
147. See id. at 448 (stating that Supreme Court precedent "instructs that a
party's nondisclosure of information to another is actionable under Rule 10b-5
only when there is an independent duty to disclose the information arising
from 'a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence' between the
parties." (emphasis in original) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 228 (1980))).
148. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty
to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them."1 1' Thus, Chiarella
stands for the proposition that one must disclose material
information only in the face of a pre-existing duty. If the
nondisclosing party has no duty, the party cannot be held liable
under Rule 10b-5.
3.

The Majority's Reliance on Chiarella, and the Dissent's
Rebuttal

The Tambone majority, citing Chiarella,averred that a duty
to disclose can only be imposed when there is a fiduciary or similar
relationship between the parties.1 52 Noting that the SEC's theory
requires disclosure of information without "the required showing
of a fiduciary relationship," the majority implied that underwriters
have no such relationship with investors. 153 After dismissing the
SEC's arguments and precedents as a "cobbled together . . .
bricolage of agency decisions and statements" in large part
because they predate Central Bank, the majority upheld the
dismissal of the SEC's claims.154
To rebut the majority's cursory dismissal of the implied duty
theory, the dissent cited a litany of decisions where underwriters
have been held subject to Rule 10(b).s55 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., for example, held
that an underwriter's failure to make a sufficient investigation of
the truth and accuracy of a disclosure document was a genuine
issue of fact.e56 The dissent also cited decisions: (i) holding that an
underwriter's delivery of a prospectus was enough to state a claim
under Rule 10b-5;157 (ii) permitting private allegations of Rule 10b5 violations against underwriters; 5 8 and (iii) finding underwriter
151. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
152. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442.
153. See id. at 448 (noting that "a party's nondisclosure of information to
another is actionable under Rule 10b-5 only when there is an independent
duty to disclose the information arising from 'a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust or confidence."' (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 222)).
154. Id. at 449-50.
155. Id. at 460-61.
156. See Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 858 (noting that an underwriter
"has an obligation to investigate the securities he or she offers to customers.").
157. See In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., No 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL
363841, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (upholding a complaint that alleged
that underwriters "individually and in concert, directly and indirectly ...
engaged and participated in a course of conduct and conspiracy to conceal
adverse material information.").
158. See generally In re MTC Elec. Techs. S'holder Litig., 993 F. Supp. 160,
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liability for intentional material misstatements in a prospectus. 169
The dissent's numerous citations along with those cited by the
SEC together cast doubt on the majority's dismissive treatment of
the underwriter's duty to investors. Noting that underwriters play
a unique role in the issuance of securities, the dissent highlighted
a history of judicial recognition of their duty. 6 0 Citing the D.C.
Circuit, the dissent noted that underwriters have a "heightened
obligation" to ensure proper disclosure.' 6' Underwriters, privy to
information largely withheld from investors, have a "concomitant
duty to investigate and confirm the accuracy" of the
representations in the sales materials they distribute.162 Through
delivery of sales material to an investor, an underwriter
represents that he has reviewed the sales material, and that he
has a reasonable basis to believe that the representations
contained therein are true and correct.163
Thus, relying on the cited precedent, the dissent stated that
"the knowing or reckless use of a prospectus containing false
statements involves the underwriter's own implied statement
falsely affirming the accuracy of the prospectus content." 164 The
majority justified its dismissal of this precedent because it predates the Central Bank decision. 65 But, as noted by the dissent,
Central Bank's holding has little to do with underwriter duties 6 6
and, therefore, does not conflict with the SEC's theory of liability.
C. A Summary of the Majority's Substantive Arguments

Thus, the majority's substantive arguments are, at best, open

162 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303,
315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
159. See generally In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
160. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 461 (stating that "[t]hese precedents reflect the
unique position of underwriters as securities insiders whose role is 'that of a
trail guide-not a mere hiking companion,' and who are relied upon by
investors for their 'reputation, integrity, independence, and expertise."'
(quoting Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc. v. S.E.C., 512 F.3d 634, 640-41 (D.C. Cir.
2008))).
161. Dolphinand Bradbury,Inc., 512 F.3d at 640-41.
162. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 461 (citing Chris-Craft,480 F.2d at 370; Sanders,
524 F.2d at 1073).
163. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 461-62 (noting that "the relationship
between the underwriter and its customers implicitly involves a favorable
recommendation of the issued security .

. .

. [A]s an underwriter selling the

[security, the underwriter] made an implied representation that it had
reasonable grounds for belief that the [securities] would be paid at maturity."
(quoting Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1073)).
164. Id.
165. See id. (noting that "[t]he majority attempts to discredit some of this
inconvenient precedent because it pre-dates CentralBank.").
166. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 461-62.
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to question. To hold that the defendants' actions did not fall within
the ordinary meaning of the rule, the majority settled upon an
unduly narrow definition of "make"167 and relied upon a structural
analysis of the rule that utterly ignored the drafter's intent.168 The
Supreme Court precedent cited by the majority was irrelevant, 169
and the majority's dismissal of the SEC's implied statement theory
failed to properly appreciate the well-established duty of
underwriters to investigate an offering. Thus, given the relatively
weak substantive arguments for the holding, it is not surprising
that the majority provided a policy-based rationale near the close
of its opinion to explain its decision.
IV. POLICY REASONS UNDERLYING THE MAJORITY'S DECISION
Despite declaring that the analysis of case law provided a
"well-lit decisional path,"170 the majority provided a policy-based
argument, hinting that the decision was not quite so clear-cut. In
holding the SEC's argument untenable, the majority stated that
"[aJdopting the SEC's implied statement theory would pave the
way for suits against securities professionals for nondisclosure of
material information without the required showing of a fiduciary
relationship." 7 1 Although ostensibly an argument against
eschewing an element of a violation (for example, the existence of
a fiduciary duty), this statement smacks of a fear of frivolous
lawsuits.1 72
Although prevention of frivolous lawsuits is an admirable
goal, the First Circuit majority gives this concern too much
deference. It is true that frivolous lawsuits create an undue
burden on the judicial system, but the majority eases this burden
to the detriment of the SEC's enforcement powers. As Supreme
Court precedent dictates, the concern of frivolous lawsuits should
not trump the judiciary's primary responsibility to provide a forum

167. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the various definitions the court came
up with for the word "make.").
168. See supra Part III.A.2 (applying context of Rule 10b-5 to the meaning of
the word "make").
169. See supra Part III.A.3 (analyzing Supreme Court cases holding that the
SEC's interpretation of the word "make" was overbroad).
170. Tambone, 587 F.3d at 450.
171. Id. at 448.
172. The concurrence latches onto this fear, characterizing the SEC's
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as "alarmingly ambitious" and expressing concern
that it would expose "virtually anyone involved in the underwriting process" to
liability. Id. at 450, 452 (Boudin, J., concurring). Asserting that "[nlo one
sophisticated about markets believes that multiplying liability is free of cost,"
the concurrence supported the majority's decision to limit the SEC's
enforcement capabilities in order to minimize these costs. Id. at 452 (Boudin,
J., concurring).
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for aggrieved parties. 7 3
A. The Problem of Frivolous Lawsuits
The threat of frivolous lawsuits, long a justification for
judicial action, has been widely reflected in the legislative history
of a number of statutes. For example, the legislative history of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995174 illustrates that the core
purpose of the statute was to curb frivolous litigation by prison
inmates,' 7 5 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2006 "was
generally seen as a response to frivolous class actions." 76 Further,
the legislative history of Title VII indicates that punitive damages
under the act were limited to egregious circumstances' 7 7 due to a
congressional desire to "prevent excessive litigation costs,"178 and
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947179 was amended with an intent to
"lessen the number of frivolous lawsuits."1s0
Beyond statutes, courts have been known to cite the threat of
frivolous lawsuits as a justification for certain decisions. A district
court in the Southern District of New York stated that courts have
a "constitutional duty to enjoin the filing of frivolous lawsuits in
order to preserve judicial resources."' 8' A court in the Southern
District of Texas expressed this sentiment more forcefully (or

173. See infra Part VI (asserting policy rationale behind the SEC's
interpretation of liability for underwriters).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2010).
175. See Jessica Feierman, Symposium, Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After
AEDPA, "The Power of the Pen" Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic
Engagement, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 381 (2006) (stating that
"[a]ccording to advocates of the [PLRA], prisoners had 'tied up the courts with
their jailhouse lawyer antics for too long[,] . . . making a mockery of our
criminal justice system,' and a reform bill would 'help put an end to the
inmate litigation fun-and-games."') (citations omitted).
176. Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History
Demands Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 62 (2007) (citing Anna
Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight Year Saga is Finally
Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 398-99, 404-05 (2005)).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2010).
178. See generally Jason P. Pogorelec, Under What Circumstances Did
Congress Intend to Award Punitive Damages for Victims of Unlawful
Intentional Discrimination Under Title VI?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1269, 1304-1305
(1999).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2010).
180. Louise Sadowsky Brock, Overcoming Collective Action Problems:
Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 798 (1997).
181. Lacy v. Principi, 317 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Gelabert v.
Lynaugh, 894 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[1ike every other
pastime, recreational litigation has its price; . . . sanctions ...

are imposed for

the very purpose of causing the would-be pro se prisoner litigant, with time on
his hands and a disposition to retaliate against the system, to think twice
before cluttering our dockets with frivolous or philosophical litigation.").
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suffered from a faulty caps-lock key) by stating that it
makes every reasonable effort to provide a forum for those truly
aggrieved. However, the case at bar is pure frivolity and a manifest
abuse of judicial process. Such frivolity wastes judicial resources,
prevents utilization of the Court by those who truly need judicial
action, and also feeds the public's apprehensions regarding abusive
and frivolous lawsuits. Plaintiffs counsel is more than welcome to
bring cases of merit in this Court; HOWEVER, FUTURE CASES
LIKE THIS WILL RESULT IN HARSH SANCTIONS. 182
The obvious victim of frivolous lawsuits is the defendant
forced to defend meritless claims, but, however melodramatic, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed a
concern for the health of the entire judicial process by stating that
the "public inevitably suffers when a vindictive plaintiff squanders
limited judicial resources by prosecuting frivolous lawsuits."183

B. The Threat of FrivolousLawsuits Does Not Justify Limiting
SEC Enforcement Power
Although judicial decisions have often barred plaintiff
recovery to avoid a potential onslaught of frivolous lawsuits, 184 it is
important to weigh the threat of frivolous claims against the much
greater evil of denying a forum for claims with merit. The
Supreme Court has solved this balancing act with the admonition
that the threat of frivolous claims should not influence a judicial
decision.1 85 As eloquently stated by Justice Souter, "[t]o the degree
... claims are meritorious, fear that there will be many of them
does not provide a compelling reason . .. to keep them from being
heard." 8 6 In the Supreme Court's decision in Tower v. Glover, the
court noted that it would be inappropriate to rule simply "in order
to prevent inundation of the federal courts with frivolous
lawsuits," and held that "[i]t is for Congress to determine whether
[particular] litigation has become too burdensome to state or

182. Uherek v. Houston Light and Power Co., 997 F. Supp. 789, 795 (S.D.
Tex. 1998) (emphasis in the original).
183. Am. Family Life Ass. Co. of Columbus v. Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559, 570
(8th Cir. 1984).
184. See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980)
(requiring exhaustion of remedies under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act); see also Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1260-61 (11th
Cir. 2000) (stating that "Congress passed the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] to
reduce frivolous prisoner lawsuits.").
185. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating "I simply cannot
agree . . . that the possibility of 'frivolous' claims . . . warrants closing the
courthouse doors . . . . There are other ways, short of that, of coping with

frivolous lawsuits.").
186. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 640, n.1
(2007).
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federal institutions and, if so, what remedial action is
appropriate."18 7 As noted by the Tower court, the judiciary does not
have the authority to make decisions based upon what a court
would "judge to be sound public policy."188
This sentiment is echoed by the dissent. Although plaintiffs
may try to stretch the SEC's interpretation of Rule 10b-5, the
dissent stressed that this "predictable and familiar phenomenon"
should not convince courts to limit the enforcement powers of the
SEC.189 Further, the SEC's interpretation does not give litigious
plaintiffs free-rein to wreak havoc on the judicial system, as a
plaintiff would still be required to meet the stringent requirements
of pleading a securities claim, which requires pleading the
allegation of fraud with particularity, and ultimately proving
reliance, causation, and monetary damages.190
Given the procedural bars in place to frustrate meritless
claims, the dissent dismissed the majority's policy concern. 19 1
Noting that there are "significant barriers" designed to address the
majority's concern, "the way to protect against overreaching by
private plaintiffs is to strictly enforce those requirements-not to
deny the SEC the full scope of its enforcement duty." 192
V. POLICY REASONS FAVORING THE SEC's INTERPRETATION
Given the dissent's well-reasoned arguments, policy
considerations were the probable tipping factor for the majority's
decision.193 For example, it is not unlikely that the majority might
have reached for the Random House Dictionary over Webster's
International if it felt that the policy so dictated. However, the
only stated policy reason for the majority's decision was to avoid
frivolous lawsuits. This consideration, laudable as it might be,
187. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916, 923 (1984).
188. Id. The court went on to state, 'We do not have a license to establish
immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound
public policy." Id. at 922-23.
189. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 456 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 463 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
191. See id. (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that "unlike the SEC," a private
plaintiff must "meet the standard requirement that allegations of fraud be
pleaded with particularity [and] also must prove reliance on the alleged
misrepresentation, economic loss, and loss causation."). The dissent suggests
that "[tihe reliance requirement, in particular, weakens [the majority's]
concern that private litigants will be able to bring impermissible aiding and
abetting claims in the guise of primary claims." Id. at 463-64 (Lipez, J.,
dissenting).
192. See id. at 456 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting the SEC's brief and noting
that "[plolicy considerations concerning private litigation can have no
relevance in defining the scope of primary liability under Section 10(b) in a
Commission enforcement action.").
193. See supra Part III.C (reiterating how the Tambone majority provided a
policy-based rationale for its decision).
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comes at the expense of narrowing the SEC's enforcement power.
Constricting that power not only conflicts with the intent of Rule
10b-5(b), but also runs contrary to the current desire of the
executive and the American public to increase government
regulation of markets. Further, and perhaps most unfortunately,
the majority provided a blueprint for underwriters and prospectus
drafters to avoid SEC enforcement of Rule 10b-5.

A. 'Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?"
To argue that policy considerations weigh in favor of the
SEC's interpretation of Rule lOb-5, it is illuminating to recall Mr.
Pike's statement that suggested that the SEC, in the very least,
should have the authority to prevent fraud.194 While it is absurd to
suggest that the majority is not "against fraud," the decision strips
the SEC of the tools necessary to prevent and investigate it.
As noted by Judge Lipez in his dissent, the majority's myopic
method of interpreting Rule lOb-5(b) ignores the intent of the
rule's drafters.s9 5 Following the majority's holding, the dissent
hypothesized that
[a]n underwriter could well know that the representations in a
prospectus are false even when the individual who actually wrote
the words were unaware of the inaccuracies. In those circumstances,
an underwriter who knowingly gives investors a prospectus
containing falsehoods could not be held liable in an SEC
enforcement action for aiding and abetting the unwitting drafter,
who did not himself commit fraud. If such an underwriter could not
be held responsible as a primary offender, the underwriter would.. .
196
be free from liability under Section 10(b) whatsoever.
As implied by the dissent's incredulous tone, this absurdity is
the result of the majority's holding. The majority's decision leaves
the SEC powerless to prosecute the unscrupulous underwriter and
an ignorant prospectus drafter under Rule 10b-5(b). This decision
is even more disturbing when one considers its potential reach, as
it is not limited to underwriters that trade in mutual fund stock.
a
containing
prospectus
a
using
underwriter
Any
Rule
10b-5(b)
from
free
misrepresentation may sell securities
liability as long as the underwriter had no drafting responsibility.
In the face of the Tambone decision, Mr. Pike's question, once
rhetorical, is now colored with a sense of unintended profundity.

194. Freeman, supra note 58, at 922.

195. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 459 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a]s
the SEC explains in its en banc brief, this understanding of what it means to

'make' a statement is necessary to fulfill the objective of Congress and the
Commission to punish 'any untrue statement of a material fact' made with
knowledge or reckless disregard for its truth." (quoting Rule 10b-5(b)).
196. Id.
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"We will not go back... ."

The Tambone decision not only flies in the face of Rule 10b5(b)'s intent, but it is patently contrary to the current desire to
achieve investor protection through greater regulatory scrutiny of
financial markets. One would be hard-pressed to find anyone
willing to state that the U.S. financial markets need less
regulation. 9 7 Even the most ardent supporters of free markets
have, albeit reluctantly, admitted that more regulation is
necessary. 198 President Barack Obama, both as candidate 9 9 and
President, has stressed the need for more regulation of markets,
not less. 200 Promising future financial regulatory reform, President
Obama warned investment firm executives that "[wie will not go
back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that
was at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated
197. See, e.g., A special report on the world economy: Taming the beast: How
far should finance be re-regulated?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2008, at 66 (noting
that "[a] financial system that ends up with the government taking over some
of its biggest institutions in serial weekend rescues and which requires the
promise of $700 billion in public money to stave off catastrophe is not an Agrade system. The disappearance of all five big American investment bankseither by bankruptcy or rebirth as commercial banks-is powerful evidence
that Wall Street failed 'the test of the marketplace.' Something has gone
awry.").
198. See Sewell Chan, Looking Back, Greenspan Says Wall Street Needs a
Tighter Rein, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at B1 (noting that Alan Greenspan,
"famous for his libertarian leanings and hands-off approach to Wall Street"
and "who has long argued that the market is often a more effective regulator
than the government, has now adopted a more expansive view of the proper
role of the state.").
199. See Christopher Cooper & Kara Scannell, Campaign '08: Obama to
Receive Endorsement of 3 Former SEC Chairmen, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008,
at A7 (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldon as saying that then-Senator
Obama recognized the "need to take a good hard look at how things are
organized [and] just exactly what went wrong in terms of the regulatory
oversight that we have.").
200. See David Leonhardt, A Free-Market-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally
Conservative Wealth Redistributionist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at MM30
(noting that "in Obama's view, the risks to market-based capitalism now have
more to do with too little regulation than too much."). See also Michael H.
Ginsberg, The "GreatRecession" and New Challenges in Product Liability and
Environmental Coverage Cases, 2010 WL 561454, at *6 (2010) (noting that
"[w]e have seen that the Obama Administration is pro-federal regulation in
many ways; therefore, I think we will see a push toward regulation of the
financial markets once we get past the current health care reform movement.
. . ."); Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and
Financial Re-Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1418 (2009) (noting that
"[t]he Obama Administration has set forth a series of principles that should
reform the regulation of credit default swaps and other derivatives, these
include the following: the development of standardized and regulated trading
platforms; the imposition of capital requirements for issuers of derivatives; the
introduction of mechanisms to improve transparency of derivatives; and the
identification of clear regulatory authority over the derivatives market.").
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only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses." 201 This is
not mere political bluster, as the President's 2011 budget proposal
increases spending for financial market regulators by fifty-five
percent. 202
Although obscured by our country's frustratingly partisan
political environment, President Obama's push to regulate
markets has been largely endorsed by public opinion. 203 In a 2008
poll, nearly seventy-five percent of Americans believed the
financial crisis was caused, in part, by a failure of government
oversight of financial markets. 204 As the financial crisis has
affected international markets as well, governmental regulation of
financial markets also has international support. 205 Many
commentators echo this desire, indicating that the general thrust
of public opinion is in favor of greater governmental oversight of
financial markets. 206
The Tambone decision is in direct conflict with this goal.
Rather than expanding (or simply maintaining) the SEC's power
to investigate and prosecute fraud, this decision sharply constrains

201. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Tough Crowd on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2009, at Bl.
202. Elizabeth Williamson & Kara Scannell, Obama's Budget Proposal:
Market Regulators Set to Get Boost, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at A6.
203. See Voters Champion Free Market But Want More Regulation,
RasmussenReports.com, Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/pub
lic content/business/generalbusiness/december 2008/voterschamption free
market but want moreregulation (noting that a "majority of voters (52%) ...
believe there is a need for more government regulation of big business.") (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010).
204. See David Pierson, Stricter business controls sought, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/15/business/fi-econpo
1115 (citing a Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg poll finding that "nearly threequarters of respondents thought the lack of regulation was partly responsible
for the current financial and housing crises" and that "stronger regulation of
financial markets was . . . the top issue for the presidential candidates to
address in the remaining weeks of the campaign.").
205. See Press Release, GlobeScan & Program of International Policy
Attitudes, Erosion of Support for Free Market System: Global Poll (Apr. 15,
2008), available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipalpdflapr08/FreeMa
rketsAprilO8_pr.pdf (citing a GlobeScan poll of 9,357 respondents in eighteen
countries that found that in "17 of the 18 countries a majority (15 countries) or
a plurality (two countries) agreed that 'the free enterprise system and the free
market system work best in society's interest when accompanied by strong
government regulation."').
206. David Kusnet, Renewed Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009 (citing
economist Jeff Madrick's argument that America "faces social and economic
challenges requiring higher taxes, increased public investment and more
rigorous regulation of corporate conduct."). See also Floyd Norris, A Retreat
From Global Banking, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at B1 (stressing "the need to
get the financial system working again, without public guarantees for
everything in sight and with enough safeguards and regulation to avoid a new
crisis.").
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the scope of Rule 10b-5(b). In taking policy considerations into
account, the majority should have held that the need for more
regulation of financial markets trumped the fear of frivolous
claims.
VI. CONCLUSION: A GUIDE TO AvOID RULE 10B-5(B)
Although Tambone involved a "tangled web of interlocking
entities," 207 only two entities are necessary to frustrate the intent
of Rule 10b-5(b) and stymie an SEC enforcement action: a parent
and a subsidiary. The parent would hire the prospectus drafters
and the subsidiary would hire the underwriters. The drafters
would be free to make any representation necessary to project a
solid investment, so long as the drafters have no actual knowledge
of any misstatement in these representations.
If, for example, the drafters know that investors are generally
wary of litigation, they need only state that there is no such
litigation pending against the parent and believe the veracity of
this representation. The underwriters will be able to use this
representation to sell the shares. The actual truth of the
representation is, under the Tambone decision, of no consequence.
Even if the underwriters know that the parent has a potentially
devastating lawsuit on the horizon, they need not fear liability
under Rule 10b-5(b). By simply delivering the prospectus, the
underwriters are not making the representation. The Tambone
decision provides a guide for avoiding what has been one the SEC's
most useful tools in enforcing securities laws and dissuading
unscrupulous practices.
Regardless of the outcome, Supreme Court review of this
decision is crucial. A reversal of the decision would represent a
victory for investors and a blow to dishonest securities sales
techniques. An affirmation of the decision would also be welcome,
as it would hopefully spur Congress to amend the language of the
statute to restore the Commission with the enforcement powers
necessary to protect investors.

207. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 438.

